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INTRODUCTION 
From time to time, courts use various descriptive words are used by courts in 
addressing insurance issues. To properly analyze the issues herein, it is important to 
distinguish a descriptive term from a term of art, even though similar words are used. For 
example, opinions sometime refer to unnamed insureds as "third parties to the contract", 
"third party claimants", "third party beneficiaries", or "injured third parties", to 
descriptively refer to someone making a first party claim who is not the "named insured". 
These references can often be confused with the terms of art such as "third party 
claimant" or "third party claim," which relate to a third party who is making a tort claim 
against the insured, not a first party coverage claim against the insurer. 
Other examples of imprecise language are general references to the word 
"insured", which descriptively means anyone who is entitled to insurance coverage under 
a policy. Often times no distinction is made between named or unnamed insureds when 
addressing coverage issues. 
It is imperative when dealing with the issues presented in this appeal that the 
confusion between terms of art and descriptive terms as used by various courts be noted 
and clarified. Even Travelers in its brief contributes to the confusion by reference to 
various descriptive terms which, though they may sound similar to terms of art, are not 
the same. 
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I. TRAVELERS IMPROPERLY DRAWS FACTUAL INFERENCES 
IN ITS FAVOR, RATHER THAN IN CANNONS FAVOR. 
Travelers asserts in its brief that Cannon misstated many of the facts, and proceeds 
to portray the facts with inferences in its favor. This is improper when addressing the 
appropriateness of a summary judgment dismissal. With the exception of the age of 
Heidi Anderson, Cannon's representations of the facts are accurate when drawing all of 
the reasonable inferences in Cannon's favor. 
1. Travelers' statement that Heidi was ten years old, rather than 12 years old, 
is correct. Cannon inadvertently misstated Heidi's age. 
2. Travelers' assertion that its first notice of loss was January 5, is incorrect. 
The record reflects that by the end of November or early part of December, 1992, Cannon 
notified the Andersons about the need for her surgery and asked them about their 
insurance to cover the expenses. The Andersons checked with their insurance agent who 
told them that Travelers would deny the claim. R. 1167 at 64. Under Utah law, notice of 
a claim to an insurance agent "is notice to the insurer." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-
312(l)(a), as amended. 
3. Travelers asserts that Day "obtained records" from Dr. Hecht and from Dr. 
Lynn Smith. In reality, Travelers received only a two sentence letter from Dr. Hecht 
indicating that Cannon had not been to her office since July, 1991 and would be unable to 
provide any information regarding a back injury in August, 1992. R. 1166, Exhibit 1 at 
p. 51. Regarding Travelers' claim that it obtained Dr. Smith's report, it was Cannon who 
gave the report of Dr. Smith to Travelers. Travelers did not even seek or obtain the office 
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records of Dr. Smith, Cannon's treating physician. Even though Travelers had a medical 
release signed by Cannon and had information about her healthcare providers, Travelers 
did nothing more to obtain the medical records or to investigate the medical causation 
between the accident and Cannon's back injuries. 
4. From the initial claim letter, Cannon informed Travelers that her parents 
and friends could verify the facts about her back injury. R. 1166, Exhibit 1 at 28. 
Cannon provided similar information again to Travelers when Travelers asked her who 
knew about her injury. R. 1167 at p. 81-82. Day made no contact with any person whom 
Cannon identified. 
There are numerous other examples of Travelers' attempts to spin the facts in its 
favor, contrary to the law under these circumstances. A careful review of the record and 
the citations to the Cannon's facts will confirm that her statement of facts is accurate 
when drawing the reasonable inferences in her favor. 
II. THE OPINIONS OF CANNONS EXPERT, GARY FYE, ARE 
APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Travelers asserts that the affidavits of Cannon's expert, Gary Fye, should be 
stricken on appeal, even though the trial court did not rule on this issue below. Travelers 
does not specify or provide any detail in its brief about what portions of the affidavits 
violate the law, but instead makes general arguments that Mr. Fye's opinions are vague, 
conclusive and legal in nature. Cannon specifically replied to Travelers' motion to strike 
the affidavits below. R. 1110-1124; R. 1165 at p. 50-55. Cannon does not address the 
details of the motion to strike since Travelers has failed to do so. 
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Under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, an expert who has "scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge", may render opinions if it "will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." There is little question that Mr. 
Fye is qualified as an expert in the area in question based upon his knowledge, skill, 
experience, training and education. Travelers does not object to his expertise in this area. 
The area of insurance claims practices is not within the general understanding of a 
fact finder. Moreover, judges often have little experience with the practice of claims 
processing and handling except for obvious abuses. An expert is necessary to address the 
subtleties of claims practices to determine whether there has been a breach of the implied 
duties. In addition, it is quite difficult to establish industry standards and appropriate 
practices without the use of an insurance claims expert. 
Mr. Fye's affidavit specifically addresses the industry standards and proper claims 
practices, and compares Travelers' handling of the Cannon claim to these standards and 
practices. This is not only an appropriate way to address Travelers' wrongful actions, but 
it may be impossible to establish a breach of the implied duties of good faith and fair 
dealing without such an expert. The fact that Mr. Fye's testimony is in the form of an 
opinion which may address an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, does not 
make it objectionable. Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence. Mr. Fye's testimony addressed 
factual issues regarding insurer's duties based on industry practices. He did not testify 
about what the legal duties are or should be. R. 1135. While the court determines legal 
duties, such duties are not determined in a vacuum, but in the context of industry 
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standards and practices, and based on the circumstances of the case. Mr. Fye's testimony 
is an integral part of this process. 
In addressing the Fye testimony, Travelers cites to Gaw v. State by and through 
DOT, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990). Gaw involved the admissibility of expert 
opinions; the court held that the two expert affidavits "were sufficient and should not 
have been disregarded by the trial court." Id. at 1137. It is important to note that the 
court's opinion in Gaw relied on American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochead, 751 P.2d 271, 
273-274 (Utah App. 1988), stating: 
In Lochead, the expert was a licensed property and casualty claims 
manager. His opinion was that American Concept had breached its duties 
of good faith and fair dealing. That opinion was based upon an 
examination of American Concept's adjuster's files. We held that 
because the adjuster's files were the type of materials upon which experts 
in the field relied, the affidavit was sufficient and, therefore, we reversed 
the summary judgment. 
798 P.2d at 1137 (citations omitted). The Fye Affidavit is similarly sufficient and 
admissible. 
Travelers also cited to Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983), a case 
involving the admissibility of a plaintiff's affidavit. The Norton court did not admit the 
affidavit because she did not "state with specificity what words were spoken by 
defendant." Id. at 859. The court concluded that her affidavit did not raise any material 
factual issues. In contrast, the Fye testimony is comprehensive and was submitted by an 
expert, raising numerous specific factual issues that would preclude summary judgment. 
Norton, Lochead, and Gaw help Cannon. 
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III. WHETHER CANNON FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF AN 
INSURED, IS NOT A NEW ISSUE RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Travelers argues that Cannon's analysis of the policy language regarding the 
definition of an insured is an issue raised for the first time on appeal and should not be 
considered by this court. In doing so, Travelers tries to isolate a very narrow subpoint of 
this issue. This is improper. The issue of whether Cannon is an insured under the 
definitions found in the policy was the very focus of Travelers' motion for summary 
judgment. It was briefed and argued to the court. R. 118, 128, 129, 154, 1066-1069, and 
1165 at 9, 27, 30-32, 42, 44. Cannon has always maintained that she was an insured 
under the language of Coverage F, and that the definition of insured did not exclude a 
person who was covered by other provisions in the policy. Cannon's discussion in her 
brief regarding the word "include" found in the definitions of the policy is merely an 
attempt to refute in advance Travelers' anticipated argument that Cannon cannot be an 
insured because she is not expressly defined as an insured. Cannon's point is not that she 
is an insured because of the interpretation of the word "include"; her point is that the 
definitions were not intended to exclude anyone else who might be insured under another 
provision, such as Cannon who is an insured under Coverage F. 
It is not uncommon on appeal that parties refine their position on issues, cite new 
authorities, give additional analysis, and give new reasons to refute points raised by 
opposing counsel. Even Travelers has done this in its brief. This does not constitute 
raising a new issue for the first time on appeal. 
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IV. TRAVELERS' CLAIM THAT ITS ACTIONS WERE FAIRLY 
DEBATABLE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF FACT. 
Travelers argues that if Cannon has a viable claim, Travelers' position was fairly 
debatable as a matter of law. Travelers' position is invalid for numerous reasons. 
The issue of fairly debatable is a factual issue, unless "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. When the evidence is uncontroverted, a court 
may summarily dispose of a bad faith claim based on the fairly debatable defense. See 
e^., Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987) (plaintiff presented 
no expert affidavit or other competent evidence of a breach of good faith duties); and 
Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 837 P.2d 263 (Utah App. 1993). However, when there are 
facts which demonstrate violations of the implied duties under Beck, it is a factual issue 
to be decided by the jury1. The fact that an insurer may contest or debate whether a claim 
is owing, is not, by itself, the deciding factor, for all insurers and their counsel will claim 
1
 The jury instruction (MUJI 21.8) regarding "fairly debatable" reads as follows: 
If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the claim, its refusal to 
negotiate or settle may not constitute a breach of its duty. 
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim if the 
supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and would lead a reasonable 
insurance company in similar circumstances to deny the claim. "Fairly debatable" 
means that the laws or facts which support the insurer's position create a 
reasonable likelihood that the denial of the claim would be upheld in court. In 
determining whether or not the insurer's position was fairly debatable and 
reasonably justified, you should consider all laws or facts upon which a 
reasonable insurance company would rely in deciding whether to pay a claim. 
This would include the laws or facts supporting the insured's position that were 
either known, or that should have been known, by the insurer. However, only 
those facts which were reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the 
contract was made and which were proximately caused by the insurer's breach 
may be considered. 
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some justification for a nonpayment of a claim. The issue is whether an insurer is 
reasonably justified as a matter of law. 
The leading case on this issue is Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 
(Utah 1996), where the insurer claimed that the denial of benefits was fairly debatable as 
a matter of law, as evidenced by various facts including a prior interlocutory appeal 
where the Utah Supreme Court held that as a matter of law it could not determine that 
benefits were owing under the policy. The court then remanded the case for trial on the 
merits. During the trial that followed, a jury instruction regarding fairly debatable, very 
similar to MUJI 21.8, was given (see Addendum A attached hereto). After the jury found 
in favor of Billings, Union Bankers appealed claiming it was fairly debatable as a matter 
of law. In Billings II, the Supreme Court explained that where there are contested issues 
of fact regarding violations of the implied duties, the matter is properly submitted to the 
jury. The Court stated: 
The first question presented is whether, under Beck, a first-party insurer 
may be held liable for breaching the implied covenant on the ground that it 
wrongfully denied coverage if the insured's claim, although later found to 
be proper, was fairly debatable at the time it was denied. The answer lies in 
the nature of the duties imposed by the covenant on an insurer: when 
confronted with a claim for benefits by a first-party insured, the insurer 
must "diligently investigate the facts..., fairly evaluate the claim, and ...act 
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim."... The terms 
used to characterize these duties plainly indicate that the overriding 
requirement imposed by the implied covenant is that insurers act 
reasonably, as an objective, in dealing with their insureds. 
Id. at 465. (emphasis in original). The court then rejected Union Bankers' argument. 
The above guidelines set out by the Utah Supreme Court demonstrate the necessity 
of Cannon's experts' affidavits, wherein Mr. Fye explained the standards of the claims 
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industry which treat unnamed claimants, such as Cannon, in the same manner as they do 
the named insureds, and that it is unreasonable in the industry to treat them as Travelers 
did Cannon. This creates issues of fact which preclude a ruling that the matter is fairly 
debatable as a matter of law. 
Travelers argues that because Cannon did not give notice of her injury to the 
Andersons or to Travelers for approximately three months, this confirms that Travelers' 
position was fairly debatable. While this fact may be considered by the jury, it does not 
decide the issue, particularly when Cannon is not claiming a breach of good faith duties 
during the first few months after the accident. On the contrary, Cannon is claiming that 
the violations occurred after Travelers received notice. Furthermore, much of the 
evidence of the violations occurred in 1993 and 1994, when Travelers closed its claim 
file, refused to further consider Cannon's claim, failed to acknowledge communications 
of Cannon's counsel, and forced Cannon to file a lawsuit. These actions occurred over a 
year after the injury, and have nothing to do with the delayed notice. In any event, all of 
this argument constitutes issues of fact which are inappropriately decided in the context 
of a summary judgment motion. 
V. TRAVELERS' ARGUMENT THAT MEDPAY COVERAGE IS 
NOT PRIMARILY FOR THE BENEFIT OF "OTHERS" IS 
UNSUPPORTED AND CONTRARY TO THE POLICY 
LANGUAGE. 
Travelers asserts, without any factual support or testimony, that the Medpay 
coverage does not make Cannon an insured because the grant of coverage is "primarily" 
intended as a benefit to the Andersons so as to "eliminate small claims that would 
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otherwise be made against the insureds." Appellee's Brief at 18.2 There is nothing 
expressly written in the policy to confirm Travelers' notion. Instead, the express 
language is to directly benefit the injured person. Travelers' assertion of "primary 
benefit" is in conflict with insurance commentators who state that Medpay "is not 
designed to protect the insured from his legal liability but to insure the payment of 
medical expenses." Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, sec. 4902.05 at 
232-33(1981). 
Certain conclusions are clear: the insurance policy directly benefits persons 
injured on the insured location; the policy provides coverage not based on fault or 
liability; it expressly imposes duties on the Medpay claimant; the claim is made directly 
to the insurer; the claim is not made against (nor does it directly involve) the homeowner. 
Both the homeowner and Medpay insured enjoy the benefits of this coverage.3 Medpay 
is not designed to insulate the homeowner from liability, rather it is to cover an injured 
person's expenses. 
Travelers has provided no evidence of "primary purpose." Travelers chose not to 
substantively contest the testimony of Gary Fye as he addressed the issue of Medpay's 
purpose. The Fye Affidavit sets forth helpful and relevant information regarding the 
purpose of Medpay coverage. Fye testified that insurance adjusters handling Medpay 
2
 It is only in this respect that Travelers asserts that the Medpay claim is a third-party liability 
claim. However, Travelers concedes that it did not have to defend the Andersons, or pay a 
judgment, or determine who was at fault. 
3
 At summary judgment, Travelers stated that Medpay "coverage is an added benefit to the 
Andersons, providing payment of medical expenses to others in certain circumstances, without 
considering fault." R. 129. 
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claims under homeowner policies treat medical payments claimants as first-party 
insureds. R. 285. In particular, adjusters "are taught that when a homeowner purchases 
homeowner's coverage, one of the benefits of the policy is that non-adversarial handling 
of first-party benefits will be available to guests, invitees, and like visitors" R. 285-286. 
The homeowner purchases the policy "as a mechanism to transfer risk of the financial 
consequences of a covered occurrence to the insurer for all first-party beneficiaries 
included in the broad grants of coverage written into the homeowner's policy." R. 286. 
Fye also testified that while the homeowner pays the premium, he "certainly doesn't 
expect that his visitors or other unnamed insureds will be subject to 2nd class or unfair 
claims handling methods." Id. While Travelers failed to support its argument, Cannon 
provided testimony, legal authority, and the express language from the contract itself 
which shows that Medpay is intended to benefit the injured claimant and that she is to be 
treated properly in a first-party context. 
Travelers also argues that Cannon has no recognized right to make and enforce a 
claim for Medpay benefits, despite the policy language. Travelers' position, as stated at 
the summary judgment hearing, was unsupportable. Travelers admitted that Cannon had 
an implied right from the contract to sue Travelers for its failure to properly pay her 
insurance benefits. R. 1165 at 45-46. Judge Thorne questioned Travelers' assertion that 
Cannon had no right to sue by asking: 
THE COURT: Isn't there an implied right though for Ms. Cannon to sue 
the company if they're not going to pay her the benefit that she's 
entitled to? 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: There's no right granted under the policy to do 
that. 
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THE COURT: There's not an explicit there, but if she has the right to 
have that money and the company won't pay her, doesn't that imply a 
right to go into court and seek that money from the company? 
R. 1165 at 45. Travelers responded by arguing that Medpay is designed to benefit the 
Andersons as part of their 'liability coverage package" and that theoretically it would be 
the Andersons' claim to pursue. Therefore, Travelers claimed Cannon could not sue the 
company. Pressed further, the Court questioned Travelers notion again. 
THE COURT: Okay, but isn't that also the equivalent of Savage where 
they have a right to sue— 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Where Savage had an expressed right, Carla 
Cannon would have an implied right by contract. Perhaps there's some 
similarity there, yes, although in Savage, Savage also had a statutory 
right too, so there are some similarities there, yes, Your Honor. 
R. 1165. at 46. 
Travelers tried to assert that the Andersons would be the persons to pursue the 
claim if Travelers refused to pay, however, that is an illogical conclusion. It is not the 
Andersons' claim to pursue, nor would they have standing to claim medical benefits. The 
Medpay claim is a no-fault, non-liability claim based on Cannon's medical expenses. The 
homeowner is not the claimant or holder of the claim. The only person to enforce this 
contract, as the Court suggested and as Travelers finally admitted, is the Medpay 
claimant—Cannon. 
VI. IMPOSING THE IMPLIED DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING ON TRAVELERS DOES NOT CREATE AN 
UNRESOLVABLE CONFLICT. 
Travelers argues that imposing implied duties of good faith and fair dealing where 
the insurer covers both the liability claim and first party claim made by the same insured 
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imposes unresolvable conflicts, citing Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 
1995). Travelers' argument is misplaced. 
It is very common for insurers to have an insured make both a first party and third 
party claim under the policy. For example, in a one car accident a wife may be a 
passenger who is injured through the fault of her husband, who is also insured under the 
same policy. The wife can make first party claims for benefits, such as PIP benefits, 
medical or disability benefits, underinsured motorist benefits, collision benefits, property 
damage benefits, etc. The wife may also make a liability claim against her husband, 
which claim is also insured under the same policy. Travelers' argument, if accepted, 
would mean that the insurer under these circumstances owes no good faith duties to its 
named insured under the first party claims because she might also be a third party 
claimant under the liability coverage, wherein the carrier owes her no implied duties of 
good faith. This is obviously wrong and does not represent what the court said in Savage. 
In Savage, an employee who was a third party claimant, making a third party 
claim against Educators Mutual, was asking the court to impose good faith duties in the 
handling of Savage's third party claim. Educators Mutual was the insurer of Savage's 
employer, and Savage did not have a first party claim for benefits. Educators Mutual 
owed its good faith duties to Savage's employer, to defend the employer from the claims 
brought by Savage. The court's comment about unresolvable conflicts related to the 
fiduciary duties to defend Savage's employer. These duties would be inconsistent with 
the implied duties to the third party claimant as it relates to the same claim (not a separate 
first party claim). 
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The present case presents a completely different scenario. Cannon did not make a 
liability claim against the Andersons, but made a first party claim for Medpay benefits 
directly against Travelers. Cannon is not asking the court to impose good faith duties to 
Cannon as a third party claimant in a third party claim against the Andersons. Cannon 
concedes that this would create unresolvable conflicts. She is asking to be treated in 
good faith and fairly in her first party claim directly against Travelers. There is no 
unresolvable conflict in this situation. 
VII. CASES RELIED UPON BY TRAVELERS ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE AND SOME DO NOT SUPPORT 
TRAVELERS1 POSITIONS. 
Travelers has cited to a number of cases which require a response by Appellant. 
In most instances, Travelers has failed to provide the court with information which 
clearly distinguishes these new cases from the case at bar. 
Travelers cites LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 
1988) and claims that the principle of applying ambiguities against the insurer, applies 
only to parties to the contract. Travelers however failed to refer the court to the relevant 
footnote, and omitted it in its Brief. Footnote 5 reads: 
"See 1A J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, sec. 360, 
at 447-54 (1981); see also id. vol. 13 at sec. 7401 (insurance contracts must 
be liberally construed in favor of policyholder or beneficiary thereof)" 
765 P.2d at 858, N.5. (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court recognizes this treatise 
principle, that liberal coverage interpretation extends to both policyholders and policy 
beneficiaries. This is important because Cannon is clearly a beneficiary of the insurance 
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policy. The policy should be liberally construed in her favor, given her status as an 
unnamed insured and contract beneficiary. 
Travelers also relies on two cases, from New Mexico and Nevada, to argue that 
the process of determining who is an insured is not part of that liberal process which 
favors policyholders and beneficiaries. Both of those cases, however, are distinguishable. 
Both cases involve subrogation against alleged negligent companies. Neither case 
involves the interpretation of whether a person who suffers injury on the insured location 
(and who submits a first party claim) is considered an insured or not. Both cases deal 
with alleged tortfeasors who were defending issues of liability, and claiming to be 
insureds under the plaintiffs policy. 
In Atlas Assurance Co. v. General Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 850 (N.M. 1979), the 
insurer issued an insurance policy to PCP to cover property damage to a construction 
project. General Builders built a masonry wall that later blew down during windstorms. 
Atlas thereafter sued in subrogation against General Builders, claiming that General 
Builders had negligently constructed the wall. General Builders argued that Atlas could 
not subrogate against its own insured, claiming that it was an additional insured under the 
policy. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the insurer 
and remanded for a determination of General Builder's status under the contract. 
Another construction case, Aetna v. Aztec Plumbing, 796 P.2d 227 (Nev. 1990), 
addresses indemnity and contribution against subcontractors for their alleged negligent 
construction of apartments. Aetna paid over $9 million to satisfy a judgment against its 
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policyholder, Home Savings Association. The subcontractors claimed that they were co-
insureds under the Home Savings policy and therefore could not be sued by the insurer. 
Neither Atlas or Aetna reflects the situation at bar, where coverage is specifically 
granted to a class of persons who suffer injury on the insured location. The direct nature 
of Cannon's relationship with Travelers, and the specific coverage under the policy, 
makes Travelers' use of Atlas and Aetna inapplicable here. 
Notably, in its Brief, Travelers does not argue that all non-privity third persons are 
excluded from favorable "insured" interpretations under insurance contracts. Travelers 
concedes that there are times when "a third person who is not a party to a contract of 
insurance" may be "entitled to a construction in his favor in determining whether that 
third person is an insured." Appellee Brief at p. 16. Certainly, Cannon's unique 
circumstance as a first party Medpay claimant and unnamed insured fits within this 
realm. 
Travelers also cites to Zegar v. Sears, 570 N.E.2d 1176 (111. App. 1991) as support 
for its argument regarding the "primary purpose" of Medpay. Appellee Brief at p. 18. 
However, Travelers failed to inform the court that Zegar first filed a third party claim 
against Sears for its negligence in polishing and waxing its floor whereon she slipped and 
fell, and thereafter she "joined Allstate as a party defendant, seeking to recover her 
medical expenses directly from the policy of insurance..." Id. The court stated: 
Allstate does not assert that an injured person may never sue it for 
medical payments under the policy. Its position is that Zegar's claim for 
medical payments is premature because she has made a tort claim against 
Sears. Presumably, Zegar has the option of either pursuing her tort claim 
against Sears and including her demand for medical expenses in the 
16 
context of that suit or releasing her tort claim against Sears and then 
seeking medical expenses from Allstate. 
Id. at 1179. This case is inapplicable because Zegar simultaneously pursued competing 
claims in the same action. In contrast, Cannon filed her action only against Travelers, 
and not the Andersons, a fact readily admitted by Travelers. R. 123-124. If anything, this 
case refutes Travelers' position that a Medpay claimant has no right to enforce a Medpay 
claim. 
To further its argument that only named insureds have rights against the insurer, 
Travelers cites to Kleckelv v. Northwestern National Casualty Co., 498 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 
App. 1998). However, it is important to note that the court acknowledged that Kleckley 
admitted she was not an insured under the Medpay policy. Furthermore, Ms. Kleckley 
apparently did not comply with the policy's provisions that required her to submit her 
claim within one year of the accident. In contrast, Cannon has long maintained her 
"insured" status pursuant to the language and provisions of the subject insurance contract, 
and she timely and properly submitted her claim to Travelers. 
The Kleckerly decision is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that the 
South Carolina Supreme Court relied on its opinion in Carter v. American Mutual Fire 
Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 368, 307 S.E.2d 227 (1983) and companion case, Carter v. American 
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 367, 307 S.E.2d 225 (1983) wherein a husband and wife 
made claims against their insurer after fire destroyed their home. The court allowed Mr. 
Carter's claim because he was the "named insured" but not Mrs. Carter's because she 
was not the named insured. This is not the law of Utah. Campbell v. State Farm, 840 
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P.2d 130, 143 n.27 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1992). The notion that a 
spouse may not assert a claim simply because she is not named in the policy was raised 
and argued by State Farm but soundly rejected by the court as meritless. Id. , 
Travelers also cites to Dairyland Ins. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 1982). 
The injured parties in Dairyland sued the tortfeasor, Ellis, however no coverage was 
afforded due to misrepresentation in the insurance application. There is nothing in 
Dairyland which approximates the contractual relationship that Cannon has with 
Travelers. The injured persons in Dairyland made liability claims; they did not have any 
first party claims to assert. They were third-party claimants. They did not come within a 
direct coverage provision for injuries suffered on an insured location. Cannon's situation 
is entirely different. 
In asserting that Cannon is not a third party beneficiary, Travelers also relies on 
Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989). In that opinion the 
Supreme Court provided the law regarding status as a third party beneficiary: 
For a third party to have enforceable rights under a contract, then, that 
party must be an "intended beneficiary" of the contract, and the 
intention of the parties is to be determined from the terms of the contract 
as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances. The intent of the 
contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be 
clear. 
773 P.2d at 1386 (citations omitted). Travelers simply argues that Cannon was not 
specifically intended as a beneficiary and therefore does not attain the status of a third 
party beneficiary. However, Cannon is a third party beneficiary to the contract because 
she falls within a specific coverage provision. The express policy language evidences the 
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intent to cover her medical expenses resulting from injury on the insured location. 
Accordingly, this case supports Cannon's position. 
Travelers noted that First Security Bank v. Branberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 
(Utah 1989) touched on the issue of the existence of implied duties of good faith and fair 
dealing. That case involves duties arising from a trust deed. The court stated that "[i]n 
short, the existence of a duty between trustee and the trustor may be implied by the 
factual situation of a particular case." Id. at 1256. 
Travelers cites to Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 758 P.2d 58 
(Cal. 1988), however, that case is distinguishable from the present appeal. In Moradi-
Shalal the plaintiff sued a Fireman's Fund insured for his negligence in an auto accident, 
settled the case, and then later sued Fireman's Fund for the way it treated her in her third 
party claim. Moradi-Shalal deals with the issue of traditional third party claimants suing 
the negligent party's insurer.4 Cannon is different in that her claim is not based on 
liability, but instead is directly covered by Travelers by Medpay. Travelers also cites to 
Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986), however, it is 
important to note that "the plaintiff Morris [was] a first party insured suing her 
insurer...." Id. at 237, n. 7. The case is based on Minnesota law and Travelers does not 
propose in this appeal to prohibit a first party insured from suing his or her insurer. 
4
 Likewise, Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) dealt with a 
traditional third party claimant's ability to sue the tortfeasor's insurer under California law. 
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VIII. TRAVELERS ARGUMENT THAT, ASSUMING CANNONS BAD 
FAITH CLAIM IS VIABLE, TRAVELERS CANNOT BE HELD 
LIABLE FOR BREACHING A DUTY NOT PREVIOUSLY 
RECOGNIZED UNDER UTAH LAW, IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Travelers argues that if the court finds a duty to treat Cannon as a first-party 
claimant or unnamed insured under the policy, then it should be exempt from this "new" 
duty because Travelers did not believe this was the law prior to such a ruling. The Utah 
Supreme Court was presented with a similar argument by an insurer in the case of 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993)("CrookstonJI"). There the 
insurer "contended] that because Crookston I articulated a new standard for determining 
the excessiveness of a punitive damage award," that the court should take into account 
this new standard and order a new trial. The Court rejected this argument, stating that 
Crookston I did not change the legal force of prior case law. Id. at 938. The insurer was 
bound by the newly articulated standard. 
Travelers' "new standard" argument is based on its contention that a Medpay 
claimant is not entitled to the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. Travelers 
makes this contention in light of substantial information presented by Gary Fye which 
indicates that Travelers knew, or should have known, that Medpay is first party coverage. 
Travelers has long known about, and been subject to, bad faith law and the consequences 
of improperly treating or handling first party claims. The fact that Travelers attempts to 
avoid this obligation does not relieve it of compliance now. Cannon has presented 
information and testimony which sets forth the standards, regulations, rules, and even 
Travelers' own applicable internal guidelines by which it has been obligated to properly 
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conduct its investigations and handle claims. The substantially uncontroverted Fye 
testimony sets forth the industry's practice of treating Medpay claimants as first-party 
unnamed insureds. Mr. Fye's testimony is based on his many years in the claims 
handling industry. Travelers' current desire to avoid its duties is further indication of its 
self-serving approach in handling Cannon's first party claim. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff/Appellant Carla Cannon seeks to have the trial court's dismissal of her 
action reversed on the grounds that: (1) Cannon is a first party insured and is accordingly 
entitled to the same remedies that any other first party insured has; (2) Travelers owes 
implied duties of good faith and fair dealing to Cannon; and (3) the breach of unfair 
claims statutes, regulations, and industry standards constitutes a tort cause of action that 
Cannon may pursue. The case should therefor be remanded for a trial of the factual 
issues of liability, causation and damages. 
DATED this 27th day of May, 1999. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Humphefys 
6than D. Alder 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN A. BILLINGS, Guardian Ad Litem 
for and in behalf of Stanley D. 
B i l l i n g s , a protected person, 
Pla in t i f f 
vs 
UNION BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Texas corporation, 
Defendant 
Ladies and Gentleman of the Jury: 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CIVIL NO. C-88-2951 
(See Instructions No. 1 to No. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _2_2" 
If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the 
claim, its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute a 
breach of its duty. 
The law or circumstances surrounding a claim may not always 
be clearly established or there may be contested law or facts 
that could support the insurer's denial of a claim. An insurer 
may be reasonably justified in denying a claim if the supporting 
law or facts are "fairly debatable" and would lead a reasonable 
insurance company in similar circumstances to deny the claim. 
"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which support the 
insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that the denial 
of the claim would be uoheld in court. In determining whether or 
not the insurer's position was fairly debatable and reasonably 
justified, you should consider all laws or facts upon which a 
reasonable insurance company would rely in deciding whether to 
pay a claim. This would include the laws or facts supporting the 
insured's position chat were either known, or that should have 
been known, by the insurer. 
